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Abstract 
Since the tragic events of September 11th, 2001 there has 
been apprehension that the United States may be ill-
prepared to prevent future terrorist events.  One source of 
concern is that a Radioactive Dispersion Device (RDD) 
could be detonated at a vulnerable target anywhere in the 
nation.  A  RDD, also known as a “dirty bomb, is a 
conventional explosive packed with radioactive material. 
The explosion could disperse radioactive material over a 
wide area.   The target could be an icon associated with 
American democracy and government, critical systems 
and infrastructure, a water supply, a nuclear power plant 
and others.  Such an event could result in impact to 
citizens and communities on a number of levels:  physical, 
economic, psychological and fiscal.  The paper provides 
an overview of salient issues associated with RDD and 
offers perspectives on the vulnerability of the U.S., to 
attacks using such devices. 
1.  Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 
    The events of September 11, 2001 raised concerns 
about America’s vulnerability to a number of potential 
terrorist threats.  Of particular concern has been the use of 
“weapons of mass destruction” (WMD). WMD is a 
generic term that could include nuclear weapons, toxic 
chemicals and/or biological agents. A nuclear WMD 
could result in death, destruction and long term 
contamination of extensive areas of a community 
(equivalent, for example, to the damage experienced from 
the Chernobyl event).  Significant economic impacts and 
“stigma” effects could result. Had the 9/11 terrorists 
utilized a nuclear WMD the consequences would have 
been even more catastrophic.   
 
    The fear of WMD has been compounded by reports of 
vulnerable security arrangements at critical infrastructure: 
ports, nuclear power plants, chemical manufacturing 
facilities, refineries and others.   
 
    Exacerbating the concerns has been an apparent 
breakdown in security arrangements in nations producing 
nuclear weapons. There is evidence to suggest, for 
example, that nuclear weapons/resources are vulnerable to 
loss in a number of nations. In particular, there has been 
 
 
 
concern about loss of nuclear weapons from stock piles in 
the nations that comprised the former Soviet Union          
(e.g., Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan).  
Evidence suggests that this laxness in security has 
facilitated the ability of rogue groups to obtain nuclear 
weapons and materials. 
 
    Similarly, individuals such as Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan 
and the policies of states such as North Korea and Iran 
have also probably provided opportunity for WMD or 
related technology to get in the hands of terrorists. 
Preventing terrorist groups from obtaining WMD will 
continue to be a major challenge for national security 
agencies.  
 
    While the U.S. has been fortunate, thus far, in avoiding 
incidents involving WMD (although the anthrax event in 
late 2001 discussed later may have been a wakeup call) it 
is difficult to know whether this has been due to improved 
national security procedures or because of fortuitous 
circumstances.   
 
2.  Radiological Dispersion Devices (RDD) 
 
    There are other concerns, however. The potential use of 
Radiological Dispersion Devices (RDD) should also 
heighten our apprehension.  RDD are also termed “dirty 
bombs,” or “weapons of mass disruption.”    
 
    Many Americans first heard the term dirty bomb on 
June 10, 2002, when Attorney General John Ashcroft 
announced the arrest of Jose Padilla on the charge of 
plotting to detonate a device containing both high 
explosive and very radioactive material.1
 
    What are RDD? Graham Allison, a leading authority on 
nuclear weapons and national security issues, defines a 
RDD as “conventional explosives packed into radioactive 
material.”2 “(RDD) can take many forms—from sticks of 
dynamite packed … with cesium to a fertilizer-based 
truck bomb wrapped in cobalt.”3 A RDD could be 
                                                 
1 Zimmerman, Peter D. with Cheryl Loeb. (January, 2004)  “Dirty 
Bombs:  The Threat Revisited” Defense Horizons 38:2. (Washington, 
D.C.:  National Defense University), 1. 
2 Allison, Graham (2004). Nuclear Terrorism:  The Ultimate Preventable 
Catastrophe.  (New York:  Henry Holt and Company), 8. 
3 Ibid. 57. 
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manufactured by surrounding TNT, C-4, or other 
chemical explosive with a radioisotope.  
 
    Many terrorist groups have the skill and materials 
needed to make the explosive part of the device. 
Terrorists could also disperse radioactive material without 
an explosive by spraying, scattering, or simply dumping 
it.4
 
    The threat posed by terrorist RDD use and the 
magnitude of potential impact are matters of contention. 
Some experts believe that terrorists could, without great 
difficulty, obtain radioactive material and construct an 
RDD. (O)thers assert that the inherent difficulties of 
handling radioactive material (coupled) with (causing 
relatively) few direct casualties make RDD less likely 
terrorist weapons.5 Despite the possible complexities, the 
potential use of RDD by terrorists makes it imperative 
that this source be considered in national security 
planning efforts. 
 
    RDD can be produced employing biological, chemical 
and radioactive materials. The radioactive segment, 
however, is the most significant for reasons ranging from 
the actual risk itself to the perception by the public of its 
danger. The focus of the paper, therefore, will be placed 
on the radioactive component of the RDD.  
 
    The radioactive materials most likely to cause harm, 
based only on their physical properties, are also those 
most widely available and having significant commercial 
application. A partial list of purposes to which radioactive 
elements are applied include medical, academic, 
agricultural, industrial, food irradiation, smoke detection, 
communication, navigation, and in oil well logging. 6
 
    The prevalence of these sources in the public domain, 
coupled with inadequate control and monitoring 
mechanisms, poses a significant threat to health and 
security, not only from the possible terrorist use of 
radioactive materials, but also from accidents. 
 
    Additional impacts from RDD would include negative 
economic influences (e.g., cost of cleanup, business 
disruption, and long term contamination) and stigma 
effects to citizens and communities.  These will be 
discussed in more detail later in the report. 
                                                                                                 
4 Jonathan Medalia. Terrorist “Dirty Bombs”: A Brief Primer. 
Congressional Research Service RS 21528, October 29, 2003, CRS-3. 
5 Don Oldenburg, “How Bad Would A Dirty Blast Be? Here's What the 
Experts Say, Washington Post, June 13, 2002, p. C1 cited in Radio-
logical Dispersal Devices: Select Issues in Consequence Management, 
Dana A. Shea, Congressional Research Service RS21766, Updated 
December 7, 2004, CRS-2. 
6 Ibid. 
3.  Terrorist Objectives 
 
    The objectives of terrorists or rogue states are 
manifold.  Besides causing death and destruction, other 
important goals are creating impact to economic interests, 
spreading fear among the civilian population, fostering 
distrust in government, and attempting to change 
governmental policies, particularly in the Middle East.  
Osama bin Laden and his cohorts have acknowledged the 
possible use of radioactivity in terrorist operations.7
 
    The Congressional Research Service (CRS) examined 
RDD issues extensively.  The CRS surmised that 
terrorists with small amounts of radioactive material 
might create as much panic RDD could attempt to 
influence policies by causing the following actions:8
 
3.1 Deaths and injuries.  
 
Any immediate casualties would most likely come from 
the explosion of a dirty bomb.9  
 
3.2 Panic.  
 
Small amounts of radioactive material might create as 
much panic as larger amounts. This could result in the 
voluntary or involuntary mass evacuation of citizens, 
 
3.3 Recruitment.  
 
The worldwide media coverage of a RDD attack would be 
a powerful advertisement for a terrorist group claiming 
responsibility.  This could assist in recruitment efforts. 
 
3.4 Asset (or geographic area) denial.  
 
Public concern over the presence of radioactive material 
might lead people to abandon a subway system, building, 
university, or areas of a city for months to years due to 
contamination concerns. 
 
3.5 Economic disruption.  
 
If a port, central area of a city, or other area of viable 
economic activity were contaminated with radioactive 
material, commerce might be suspended or curtailed. This 
could create economic impact.  
 
7 “One can use them (radioactive elements) to contaminate an area or to 
halt the advance of an enemy.” Statement from Abu Khabab, al Qaeda’s 
WMD chief, in a letter recovered in Afghanistan after the fall of the 
Taliban cited in Bergen, Peter L. (2006), The Osama bin Laden I Know. 
(Free Press: New York), 345. 
8 Medalia, CRS-4. 
9 U.S.Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dirty Bombs and Basement 
Nukes, March 6, 2002, 8. 
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3.6 Long-term casualties.  
 
Inhalation of radioactive material or exposure to gamma 
sources could lead to (an unknown number of long-term) 
casualties. 
 
4.  What are the Odds?  
 
    How feasible would it be for terrorists to obtain 
materials to develop a RDD and to carry out an attack?  
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has estimated 
that approximately one licensed U.S. (radioactive) source 
is lost every day of the year.10 An August 2003 United 
States General Accounting Office report states that from 
1998 to 2002 there were over 1300 incidents in which 
sealed sources were lost, stolen, or abandoned in the 
United States.11 These “orphan” sources generally remain 
undiscovered. 
 
    By far the most likely route for terrorist acquisition of 
intermediate amounts of radioactive material (defined as 
between 100 and 10,000 curies) is open and legal 
purchase from a legitimate supplier. Until the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, regulation of radioactive sources was 
focused on ensuring the safe use of the material by people 
and organizations presumed to be acting without malice.  
 
    In addition to purchase, the prevalence of equipment 
employing radioactive elements for medical and other 
purposes provides ample opportunities for theft. 
 
5.  How Destructive are RDD? 
 
    The destructiveness of a RDD is contingent on a 
number of factors: 12  
 
(a) The characteristics of the radioactive element 
employed is important (e.g., energy, type of radiation, 
half-life). Radioactive elements (including their isotopes), 
using cesium, bond strongly to concrete and asphalt.  This 
could also complicate decontamination efforts and 
increase cleanup costs.  
 
(b) Smaller particles would be dispersed more easily (than 
larger ones) and, potentially, (be transported) to greater 
distances. Smaller particles are also more readily 
inhalable.  
 
                                                 
                                                
10 Private communication with Abel Gonzalez, head of waste disposal 
and security, IAEA, and Richard Meserve, then-chairman, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission cited in Zimmerman and Loeb, op.cit. 2. 
 11 U.S. General Accounting Office. (August 2003) “Nuclear Security: 
Federal and State Action Needed to Improve Security of Sealed 
Radioactive Sources,” GAO-03-804. 
12 See Medalia, CRS-3. 
(c)  The greater the quantity of radioactive material, the 
greater the extent of physical impact.  
 
(d)  The greater the quantity of conventional explosives 
employed, the greater the potential for radioactive 
material to be dispersed more widely.  
 
(e) Meteorological conditions would play a role in the 
dispersion of radioactive materials. Wind speed and 
direction, for example, would determine the dispersion 
location and the extent of contamination. Precipitation 
would concentrate radioactivity on certain land surfaces 
and water sources.  
 
 (f) The availability of the radioactive elements, the 
portability of the weapon, and the characteristics of the 
environment will also determine the effect of the RDD. 
 
6.  Potential RDD Impacts 
 
    In examining the potential impacts from the detonation 
of a RDD, it is first important to consider the costs 
incurred from the events of September 11th.  These 
included thousands of deaths, the destruction of buildings 
and infrastructure, billions of dollars in loss of economic 
activity, costs of cleanup, reconstruction and health care.  
It could also be argued that 9/11 caused the weakening of 
American liberties, and the loss of life and treasure from 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.   
 
    A RDD strategically placed in a large American city, at 
an event or in an area where large numbers of people 
congregate could create extensive and similar negative 
effects.  Previous experience suggests that RDD could 
cause impacts disproportionate to the significance of the 
incident. 
 
    Adding to the uncertainty is that a number of methods 
can be employed to disseminate radiological material. For 
example, some forms of isotopes can be dissolved in 
solvents and sprayed widely; still others can be burned or 
vaporized.13  
 
    Any (comprehensive) plan to respond to an RDD must 
take into account all of the reasonable ways such a device 
might function, including those so stealthy that the 
population might ingest or inhale significant doses before 
an attack becomes apparent.14
 
    Figure 1 is illustrative of the potential geographical 
impact of a RDD placed in the Capitol Hill area of 
Washington, D.C. As discussed in the prior section the 
 
13 Ibid., 5. 
14 Ibid. 
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extent of contamination is contingent on a number of 
variables. Similar effects could be experienced in 
communities throughout the country. 
 
    Damages from a RDD (or WMD) can be categorized as 
deterministic, stochastic, economic, psychosocial and 
physical. 
 
6.1 Deterministic Injuries.  
 
Radiation is said to cause deterministic harm if an 
individual can be identified who received a known 
exposure to radiation and became ill as a result. Such 
illness or injury can include classic radiation sickness 
(hematological effects, loss of appetite, vomiting and 
other gastrointestinal damage, hair loss, and death) or 
radiation burns on the skin. In general, the threshold dose 
for deterministic injury is quite high.15
 
6.2 Stochastic Injuries.  
 
A common assumption is that any radiation dose, no 
matter how small, can cause harm and that the biological 
response increases with the size of the dose. It is 
conceivable that some individuals exposed to quite small 
doses of radiation might develop cancers. The risk of 
developing a health problem, including cancer, can 
increase with added radiation exposure.16
 
6.3 Economic Impact.  
 
It is likely that any RDD involving more than a few curies 
of radioactive material will contaminate some areas so 
heavily that any economic viability would be permanently 
destroyed. The contaminated area would either be 
abandoned and fenced, any buildings razed, the soil (at 
the site) excavated to a depth of a meter or so, and 
removing both building waste and soil to a low-level 
radioactive waste depository (as happened at Goiânia 
discussed in the next section). Even after cleanup has 
been accomplished, there would likely be residual public 
fear of the site. Any tourist related activities would be 
impacted and other commerce handicapped. If an 
agricultural area is involved, the farmers may find it 
difficult to market their produce.17
 
    The economic impact on a major metropolitan area 
from a successful RDD attack could exceed that of the 
September 2001 attacks. The estimated cost to return the 
lower Manhattan area to conditions prior to the September 
                                                 
                                                
15 Glasstone, Samuel and Philip J. Dolan, (1977) the Effects of Nuclear 
Weapons, 3d Ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Departments of Defense and 
Energy), 578, et seq. 
16 Zimmerman and Loeb, 2. 
17 Ibid, 9. 
terrorist attacks was in excess of $30 Billion. The 
immediate response costs exceeded $11 Billion.18
 
    Much of the private cost of recovery from the 
September 2001 attacks was paid by insurance. That may 
not be the case following an RDD attack. Radiation is a 
specifically excluded risk in virtually all policies written 
in the United States. The government, therefore, would 
have to step in to subsidize economic recovery after an 
attack, or some form of insurance reform would be 
required to facilitate economic recovery.19
 
6.4 Psychosocial Damage.20  
 
Psychosocial effects are likely to be one of the most 
serious impacts from use of a RDD. The fear of ionizing 
radiation is a deep-seated and frequently irrational 
carryover from the Cold War.21
 
    Graham Allison describes probable impacts in the 
aftermath of a RDD incident. “After a radiation bomb 
attack, the panic will likely be even more widespread.  
Fear of radiation exposure … will prompt many people to 
flee their homes.” 22   
 
    The anthrax attacks of October 2001 in Washington, 
D.C. may provide an analogue.  In that event letters 
containing anthrax spores were sent to Congressional 
representatives and media personnel. Anthrax spores were 
spread through the ventilation system in the Hart Senate 
Office Building and several Washington, D.C. area post 
offices.  Three months later, after extensive disinfection 
with chlorine dioxide gas, at a cost of $20 million, the 
buildings were finally reopened.23  Associated with this 
event was the considerable panic to the public from the 
uncertain risk. 
 
6.5 Infrastructure Damages. 
 
     In the long term (if a RDD is detonated in an urban 
area), entire city blocks will have to be decontaminated.  
Radioactive dust particles will require vacuuming or 
pressure washing to remove.  Sandblasting and acid will 
be needed where radioactive material has penetrated 
deeply.  Concrete, asphalt, vegetation, and topsoil might 
have to be excavated and disposed of safely.  Thousands 
 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 These could also be termed as “stigma” and “socioeconomic” impacts, 
respectively. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Allison, Ibid. 
23 Allison, 59. 
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of people would have to relocate, and some might never 
be allowed to return.”24
 
 
Figure 1. 
Hypothetical Cesium Bomb Impact 
Washington, D.C. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Federation of American Scientists 
 
6.6 Other Effects. 
 
    Finally, because of the great trauma that the nation 
experienced due to 9/11, RDD could greatly exacerbate 
national insecurities on terrorism and create other 
unknown effects to our government and way of life. 
 
7.  The Lessons from Goiânia and TMI 
 
    Examining an analogous incident, although unrelated to 
terrorism, can illustrate potential economic impacts. What 
is interesting is that these effects can be attributed more to 
fear than actual risk. 
  
    Although not attributed to terrorists, scavengers in 1987 
dismantled a metal canister from a radiotherapy machine 
                                                 
                                                
24 Ibid. 
at an abandoned cancer clinic in Goiânia, Goias State, 
Brazil.  Goiânia is a city with a mixed industrial and 
tourist economy located west of Brazil’s capital, Brasilia. 
Five days after the theft a junkyard worker pried open the 
lead canister to reveal what was described as “a pretty 
blue, glowing dust,” which turned out to be radioactive 
cesium137. In the following days, scores of Goiânian 
citizens were exposed to the radioactive element.25 
Several deaths and many injuries were attributed to 
exposure to the radioactive element. 
 
1 Cancer death/100     Costs to all levels of Brazilian government and the 
economy were dramatic. The physical decontamination 
effort, for example, covered about one square kilometer 
(roughly 40 city blocks), demolished seven homes and 
other buildings, and produced about 3,500 cubic meters of 
radioactive waste. The clean-up costs amounted to $20 
million. Hundreds of millions of dollars were estimated to 
have been lost due to the collapse of the tourism industry 
and impacts to businesses. Many people left the area due 
to fears of the remaining contamination, and although not 
contaminated, prices of manufactured products fell by 40 
percent and stayed at that level for 30 to 40 days.26  
1 Cancer death/10,000
 
1 Cancer death/1,000 
    The Government Accounting Office (GAO) itemized 
negative economic effects from the incident:27
 
    “Economically, there was discrimination against 
products from Goiânia, resulting in a 20 percent decrease 
in the sales of cattle, grains, and other agricultural 
products from the region. Tourism decreased virtually to 
zero and the gross domestic product for the region 
declined from pre-accident levels. In total, the direct and 
indirect costs for emergency response and remedial action 
are estimated to be $36 million.28
 
    News reports about the accidents and events associated 
with modern science of technology (which could include 
the radioactive elements in the Goiânia incident) have, in 
certain cases, stigmatized places, products and 
technologies.29
 
    Assessing the impacts from incidents such as Goiânia, 
a minor event involving a relatively unimportant 
radioactive source, provides some perspective on 
potential impacts that could take place from the 
detonation of a dirty bomb. 
 
 
25 Dwyer, Augusta. Playing with Radiation. Macleans. 100:44; 44. 
26  http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/radtutorial/2_brazil.html) 
(http://www.nbc-
med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/CaseStudies/csGoiania.html 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Gregory, R., Flynn, J., and Slovic, P. (1995) “Technological Stigma,” 
American Scientist, 83: 220-223. 
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    While in the case of Goiânia cultural differences were 
examined (although Goiânia was a somewhat 
sophisticated industrial area located relatively near to the 
nation’s capital of Brasilia) there is evidence to suggest 
that Americans would react similarly.   
 
    The accident at the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear 
power facility near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania on March 
28, 1979, demonstrated that the United States is not 
immune to situations of unpredictable behavior. For 
example, what began as an evacuation advisory from 
Pennsylvania’s Governor Thornburgh many was looked 
upon by the public more seriously.   
 
    “Thousands of people made hasty preparations to leave 
their homes, phone lines jammed, lines formed at gas 
stations, and traffic backed up.  There was palpable 
concern, confusion, and anger.  Approximately 144,000 
people within a fifteen-mile radius of the plant evacuated 
at some point during the crisis.”30
 
Goiânia and TMI provide important examples of how the 
public might react to an attack involving RDD.  
 
8.  Summary 
 
    RDD pose a unique threat to American citizens.  While 
an RDD attack is unlikely to cause mass fatalities, such 
weapons offer the potential to create mass panic and 
extensive economic impact.  RDD could be constructed 
with small quantities of fissionable or non-fissionable 
material laced with chemicals and biological agents.  In 
addition to utilizing potentially common radioactive 
materials from, for example, x-ray machines (Cs137), 
smoke detectors and similar, etc., the devices are easily 
made portable. 
 
    Part of the danger is attributable to the fact that 
extensive amounts of materials, radioactive and chemical 
are widely available in the nation.  Since equipment 
utilizing radioactive elements have become integral to 
day-to-day American life it will be extremely difficult to 
prevent the loss of these materials. 
 
    Despite the sense of vulnerability to terrorism created 
by the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, an adequate 
system of licensing and control of radioactive sources 
designed need to be given priority in national security 
efforts.  
 
                                                 
                                                
30 Walker, J. Samuel. (2004) Three Mile Island: A Nuclear Crisis in 
Historical Perspective. (Los Angeles: University of California Press), 
137-8. 
    To learn more about RDD there are numerous excellent 
references available.  The Reference section at the end of 
the text notes several excellent documents. 
 
9.  Recommendations. 
 
    The following are selected recommendations by 
authorities that would assist in preventing or remediating 
effects from a RDD:31
 
▪ RDD must be recognized by the Department of 
Homeland Security and related state emergency response 
agencies as a potentially significant terrorist threat. While 
WMD are being evaluated by some agencies, the use of 
RDD by terrorists may be more likely. Greater planning 
efforts are required both for prevention purposes and to 
ameliorate potential effects should an attack occur. 
 
• The Department of Energy weapons laboratories, in 
cooperation with other agencies and institutions, should 
identify, test, and deploy technologies that would enable 
the rapid cleanup and decontamination of buildings, 
vehicles, and similar. 
 
• Citizens are not currently able to obtain insurance to pay 
for the results of radiological terrorist events. Even the 
smallest of attacks could result in financial catastrophe for 
victims. It goes without saying that the cost of cleanup, 
even if feasible, would be too great to be borne by 
individual owners and businesses. (Indeed, cleanup to the 
degree that buildings could be reoccupied might not be 
possible)  
 
There is precedent for government to provide insurance 
assistance.  The Federal government, for example, 
currently subsidizes flood insurance. Providing some 
form of national insurance against radiological terrorism 
could be explored. The Price-Anderson Act (PAA) 
already offers insurance coverage for nuclear accidents 
caused by a licensed company or nuclear power facility 
acting within the terms of its license. PAA compensated 
the victims of the Three Mile Island event. Expanding 
coverage under PAA to include victims of radiological 
terror would be one way to compensate uninsured 
victims.    Another option would be that the government 
could mandate the inclusion of radiation as an insurable 
risk in standard-form insurance policies.  
 
• Evidence suggests that residual radiation will reduce 
property values in or near a contaminated area. This could 
be offset by a direct payment by the federal government 
to affected property owners. Legislative or regulatory 
remedies could also provide relief to Americans in the 
 
31 Zimmerman, Ibid. 
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wake of an RDD attack on issues such as property value 
impacts. 
 
• Where feasible, non-radioactive technologies such as X-
rays and accelerators should be substituted for radioactive 
sources. This will reduce the opportunities for loss, theft 
and misuse of radioactive materials. 
 
• A program of public education about the dangers of 
RDDs, how to behave after an attack, should be instituted 
as soon as possible.   
 
• Citizens can contribute to preventing RDD attacks or 
reducing their effects. Since 9/11 most Americans are 
aware, for example, of the importance of identifying 
unattended packages or of reporting individuals acting 
strangely. Developing “situational awareness” in citizens 
is important. Some of our biggest successes have been 
made by an observant public.32  
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